What Have You Done for Me Lately? by Hallock, Kevin F.
University of Richmond 
UR Scholarship Repository 
Economics Faculty Publications Economics 
4-2014 
What Have You Done for Me Lately? 
Kevin F. Hallock 
University of Richmond, president@richmond.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/economics-faculty-publications 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Labor Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hallock, Kevin F., PhD. 2014. "What have You done for Me Lately?" Workspan 57 (4) (04): 12. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu. 
Kevin F. Hallock, Ph.D. 
Donald C. Opatrny ’74 Chair, 
Department of Economics  
Cornell University
Joseph R. Rich ’80 Professor,
Departments of Economics and HR Studies 
Cornell University
Director,  
Institute for Compensation Studies,  
Cornell University
Board Member,  
WorldatWork Society of Certified Professionals
research for 
the real world
What Have You Done 
for Me Lately?
Does when we 
perform well have an 
impact on our pay?
Long ago, I worked in a small 
organ izat ion that  (progres -
sively, for the time) sought the 
input of subordinates, including 
me, on the performance of our 
managers. Although I was really 
young and not thinking this way 
at the time, I am now convinced 
that my manager went out of his 
way to be kind and ingratiate 
himself with me and fellow subordinates, but only around 
the time of the annual performance review. Why?
I think the manager may have had an appreciation for the 
well-known compensation problem of evaluators placing 
undue weight on the most recent performance. If this 
manager was particularly kind to us just before we filled 
out our surveys, maybe we would evaluate him higher.
This has me thinking more about pay for performance 
incentives and the timing of that performance. Do some 
occupations or pay plans create incentives to strategically 
time your best performance? What problems does that create?
Major League Baseball and 
Performance in a Contract Year
One set of occupations for which there is a lot of anecdotal 
evidence and volumes of discussion regarding performance 
timing is professional athletics. In “The Dynamics of 
Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball 
Long-Term Contracts,” ( Journal of Sports Economics, 10(1), 
February 2009, 6-21), Anthony C. Krautmann and John L. 
Solow considered the case of professional baseball players 
who have contracts for a set number of years. In particular, 
they examined the performance of players over the entire 
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span of their contracts and investigated (among 
other issues) the incentive to perform well to 
land a better next contract versus the disincen-
tive effects of a fixed contract coming to an 
end. They were careful to control for statistical 
issues that may cloud the results (such as the 
chances that a given contract is likely the last 
one for the player). Among their findings were 
that players who are less likely to sign an addi-
tional contract have a substantial reduction 
in performance, relative to what is predicted 
based on their characteristics. In other words, 
having a contract with an impending end date 
and no contract renewal worsens the player’s 
performance. Krautmann and Solow, however, 
also found evidence that players they predict 
to sign another contract only perform about 
as well as expected, neither improving nor 
worsening their predicted performance.
Executive Pay and the 
Timing of Performance 
Salespeople who have (say, quarterly) bonus opportunities 
may have the incentive to move sales from one period to the 
other. For example, if an employee has met his/her quarterly 
bonus target, he/she may hold back additional sales until the 
next quarter in hopes of working toward the next quarterly 
bonus. And that may not be optimal for the organization. 
But, what about those at the top of the management 
pyramid? I wrote a paper with Paul Oyer (Stanford Business 
School) called “The Timeliness of Performance Informa-
tion in Determining Executive Compensation,” ( Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 1999, 5(4), 303-321) for which we 
studied the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
pay. Our interest: “Do corporate boards consider smoothly 
performance throughout the year or do they concentrate 
more on CEO/firm performance just prior to their compen-
sation decisions?” This is a question directly related to my 
manager so long ago and to professional athletes.
Based on a sample of a few thousand executives, we found 
something consistent with the “contract-year performance-
shift” idea. That is, we found evidence of a stronger link 
between CEO pay and the firm’s sales revenue in the fourth 
fiscal quarter than in the other three quarters. In other 
words, CEOs may have some financial incentive to shift 
sales closer to the timing of the board’s compensation deci-
sion. However, questions remain, such as: Is there a good 
reason for a board to put extra weight on the CEO’s most 
recent performance, or is performance pay creating some 
net negative outcome for shareholders?
Timing Going Forward
There certainly is plenty of evidence across a set of indus-
tries that the timing of performance can have real effects on 
the compensation of employees. To the extent that this gives 
employees (athletes, salespeople, executives and others) 
incentives to shift the timing of effort in ways that may not 
be in the best interests of the employer, shareholders and 
other constituents is certainly something worth thinking 
about if we want to better curb such unwelcome gaming. 
For me, because annual reviews at Cornell are done around 
now and I am the chair of a large department, I am now 
thinking about whether and how this timing of performance 
issue could be hitting home within my own organization. 
Are you wondering the same? 
If an employee has met 
his/her quarterly target, 
he/she may hold back 
additional sales until the 
next quarter in hopes of 
working toward the next 
quarterly bonus.
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